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Introduction
On August 28, 1996, the Department of Health and Human
Services announced a final rule regulating tobacco advertising to limit
children's' exposure to its influence.1 One of the central provisions of
this rule is an absolute prohibition of the sponsorship of sporting
events, except in the corporate name.2 The rule gave the Food and
Drug Administration jurisdiction to enforce the tobacco advertising
regulations.3 While adding new complexities to the national
controversy over tobacco and leading to litigation,4 this rule calls for
new legislation to supersede this rule,5 and attempts at compromise
1. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1997) (to be codified at
21 C.F.R. pt. 897).
2. 21 C.F.R. § 897.34 (1996).
3. Id.
4. Even before this announcement, a number of tobacco companies sued for
injunctive and declaratory relief against the FDA in the Federal Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina. Under the consolidated title Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, the
court granted partial summary judgment for the tobacco companies on April 25, 1997.
Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997). As discussed later in this
note, Judge William Osteen's ruling recognized the FDA's right to regulate tobacco and
restrict its sale, but found the proposed restraints on advertising and promotion were
beyond the statutory authority of the agency. In doing so, the court failed to address both
the First Amendment and takings claims. Both the government and the tobacco companies
have appealed this ruling, and the Fourth Circuit heard oral arguments on August 11, 1997
under the title Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, No. 97-1604. The briefs on
the motion for summary judgment and appeal are available at the Department of Justice
website. See Department of Justice, Tobacco Litigation (visited Mar. 3, 1998)
<http://www.USdoj.gov/civil/cases/tobacco.html>. The plaintiffs' initial complaint in the
case is available in LEXIS, Hottop Library, Extra, Extra Archives, Recent Tobacco Cases
File.
5. During the first session of the 105th Congress, Senator Ford of Kentucky
introduced the Tobacco Products Control Act of 1997. S. 201, 105th Cong. (1997). This
legislation encompasses some of the restrictions on advertising called for under the rule,
most noticeably those provisions related to advertising near schools. Id. At the same time,
the legislation would avoid FDA regulation and permit tobacco advertising at sporting
events where children make up less than 25% of the audience. Id Since the major study
relied on by Health and Human Services quantified attendance by children at motor sports
events at about 7%, this would void almost any ban on tobacco sponsorship as it related to
NASCAR. See J. Slade, Tobacco Product Advertising during Motor Sports Broadcasts: A
Quantitative Assessment, presented at the Ninth World Conference on Tobacco and
Health, Oct. 10-14, 1994 (cited at Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of
Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 60 Fed. Reg.
41,314, 41,332 n.225 (1995) (Aug. 11, 1995)).
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between state governments and the tobacco industry.6 Much of the
debate in law reviews has centered on First Amendment protection of
commercial speech7 and whether the FDA has authority to regulate
tobacco at all.8 It is understandable that the companies and
commentators wish to either defeat or uphold the regulations in full.
However, a looming question remains-if the government can and
does ban the use of tobacco product names in sports, what will the
tobacco giants do? Will companies just rename their events and move
on, as the law allows?9 At least one commentator thinks so, positing
that the Winston Cup might become the R.J. Reynolds or Nabisco
Wafers Cup.10 However, the cost of this sponsorship alone is
prohibitive enough (estimates range from $30 to $40 million per
year)" to make any changes hard for even R.J. Reynolds to swallow. 12
As an alternative, the industry has alleged that this regulation
constitutes a taking of their property, requiring compensation under
6. Perhaps prompted by the unsettling nature of Judge Osteen's ruling, the five
major tobacco companies and 40 state attorneys general reached an agreement in principal
on June 20, 1997. See Felix H. Kent, Reviewing 1997: Tobacco Settlement, N.Y. L.J., Dec.
19, 1997, at 3. This settlement has been roundly criticized as not going far enough, but
would implement many of the same restrictions the FDA has proposed, including those on
sports. See, e.g., Peter Hanauer, Dealing With the Devil, RECORDER, July 2, 1997, at 5.
7. See, e.g., Jeff I. Richards, Politicizing Cigarette Advertising, 45 CATH. U. L. REV.
1147 (1996); Mark R. Ludwikowski, Comment, Proposed Government Regulation of
Tobacco Advertising Uses Teens to Disguise First Amendment Violations, 4 COMMLAw
CONSPECTUS 105 (1996); Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment,
81 IOWA L. REV. 589 (1996); and Daniel Helberg, Note and Comment, Butt Out: An
Analysis of the FDA's Proposed Restrictions on Cigarette Advertising under the
Commercial-Speech Doctrine, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1219 (1996).
8. See, e.g., Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Nicotine Withdrawal: Assessing the
FDA's Effort to Regulate Tobacco Products, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1 (1996); Charles J. Harder,
Comment, Is it Curtains for Joe Camel? A Critical Analysis of the 1995 FDA Proposed Rule
to Restrict Tobacco Advertising, Promotion and Sales to Protect Children and Adolescents,
16 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 399 (1995); Michael Whatley, Note, The FDA v. Joe Camel: An
Analysis of the FDA's Attempt to Regulate Tobacco and Tobacco Products under the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 22 J. LEGIS. 121 (1996).
9. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,396.
10. See David Geising, The Race Around the FDA, Bus. WK., Sept. 9, 1996, at 38, 40.
11. Id. See also John D. Battle, Curtailing Tobacco Ads May put Dent in Racing,
AFrERMKT. Bus., Oct. 1, 1996, at 1.
12. Overall, the tobacco industry spent almost $185 million on sponsorships and
advertising of motorsports in the United States in 1995. Gary Mihoces, Ban has Fans
Smokin' Mad: Long Tussle Looms as Sponsors Begin to Contest Rule in Court, USA
TODAY, Sept. 11, 1996, at 3C.
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the Fifth Amendment. 3 The goal of this note is to analyze this latter
possibility, using the particular situation of the Winston Cup
sponsorship as its model. This note begins with an introduction to
NASCAR and the role of tobacco within the sport. Next it looks at
the current controversy and postulates why takings doctrine, rather
than any First Amendment protection or claims that the FDA lacks
jurisdiction, may be more appropriate to this situation. This note then
applies the takings doctrine to the Winston Cup, to determine if a
compensable taking has occurred. This note concludes that the
prohibitions are probably Constitutional, but courts should require the




A. NASCAR, Tobacco and Money
NASCAR, or the National Association for Stock Car Automobile
Racing, was founded in 1947 by Bill France, Sr.14 It began As a family
enterprise, and still is-perhaps the only major sporting league or
association in America where one family has absolute control. 5 Many
people may scoff at the idea of characterizing anything as
quintessentially "redneck" 16 as stock car racing "major," or even a
sport. Nonetheless, NASCAR certainly is ambitious. As one observer
has remarked, "NASCAR wants to be considered in the same breath
with the NFL and the NBA." 17 It also has proven to be a lucrative
business, bringing in approximately $2.2 billion in revenue in 1995
13. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at paragraph
96, Coyne Beahm, 966 F. Supp. at 1374 (Nos. 2:95CV00591, 2:95CV00593, 2:95CV00706,
6:95CV00665) (available in LEXIS, Hottop Library, Extra, Extra Archives, Recent
Tobacco Cases File).
14. See RICHARD HUFF, BEHIND THE WALL - A SEASON ON THE NASCAR CIRCUIT
42 (1992).
15. See Suzanne Oliver, A Fan-Friendly Sport, FORBES, July 3, 1995, at 70, 71.
16. NASCAR is actively trying to shed this image. See Bruce Horovitz, Fine-tuning an
Image: New Breed of Sponsors Race to NASCAR, USA TODAY, Apr. 5,1996, at lB.
17. Id. (comment of Ernie Saxton, publisher of Motorsports Sponsorship).
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alone,18 and increasing the France family fortune to over $500
million.19
Perhaps the first seminal moment in the history of NASCAR
came in 1959. In that year, Bill France, Sr. completed the Daytona
Motor Speedway.20 Every February the most famous-and many
would say the most important-race of the NASCAR season is run:
the Daytona 500.21 Despite occurring early in the racing season,
winning Daytona is likened to winning the Super Bowl.22 The
legendary clashes on that course are a large part of the mystique of the
circuit, much as the Indy 500 is to Indycar racing.23
During this formative period, drivers survived mainly through
financial and product support from car product companies.24 There
was no concept of team sponsorship until 1969, when the support of
the car product companies unexpectedly disappeared.25 Bill France
sought out many companies that he thought were suitable, but there
were few takers. Finally, in early 1971, hoping to get some desperately
needed financial support, Junior Johnson went to the board of R.J.
Reynolds. 26 He knew they had been banned from advertising tobacco
products on television and radio, and thought they might be
interested.27 They refused to sponsor his car, in part due to concern
about the violence associated with automobile racing. 28 At the same
18. Id.
19. Oliver, supra note 15, at 71.
20. Id. at 72. The France family runs Daytona, along with Talledega and two other
race tracks, as a wholly separate, publicly traded company, International Speedway Corp.,
of which they own 61% of the stock. Id.
21. HUFF, supra note 14, at 34.
22. Id. at 38.
23. NASCAR has even tread on the sacred ground of Indianapolis Motor Speedway,
running the Brickyard 400 on the famous oval for the last two years. See Oliver, supra note
15, at 73.
24. See PETER GOLENBOCK, AMERICAN ZOOM: STOCK-CAR RACING FROM THE
DIRT TRACKS To DAYTONA 43 (1993) (interview with Humpy Wheeler, President,
Charlotte Motor Speedway).
25. Id. at 43.
26. Id. at 109 (interview with Junior Johnson). Junior Johnson is considered one of the
icons of NASCAR, having won the second Daytona 500 in 1960. Id. at 107. Since 1966, he
has been one of the most consistently successful team owners on the NASCAR circuit. IL
at 106.
27. Id. at 109. The legislation in question was the Public Health Cigarette Smoking
Act of 1969 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994)).
28. Id. at 84 (interview with Jim Foster, President, Daytona Motor Speedway).
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time, they had an enormous amount of money earmarked for
advertising.29 To allay their fears, Bill France convinced them to
sponsor one event that first year, naming it after Reynolds' chief
brand, Winston cigarettes.30 The result was positive enough that the
compan, agreed to sponsor the overall point championship for the
next year, becoming the Winston Grand-National Championship;
after several years of sponsorship, the circuit was renamed Winston
Cup.3
1
The rest, as they say, is history. R.J. Reynolds' involvement led to
the involvement of other tobacco and beer companies, which led to
other forms of corporate sponsorship. 32  Today, such diverse
companies as McDonald's, QVC, and Helig-Myers Furniture have
sponsored cars.33 It would be naive to claim that this was out of some
desire to further the sport-the obvious lure for sponsors is
exposure.34 Sponsorship in NASCAR has become especially popular
since it was reported in the early 1990's that fans of the circuit were
more product loyal than any other sport.35 At the same time, the
popularity of NASCAR has grown to become a national presence.36
The France family has been quick to profit from this new
popularity. There are no fewer than 100 officially licensed NASCAR
products. 37 Some of the more exotic ones include both video games
and "virtual" races, sport parks featuring "geared-down, sub-compact
Winston Cup clones," and NASCAR Thunder stores.38 The Frances
have also sought out sponsors with broader fan appeal. One of the
newest, and most popular, is the Cartoon Network.39 This sponsor
29. Id. at 109. Johnson reports the figure as $300 million, although that seems hard to
believe. Even a fraction of that was far more than anyone else was offering.
30. Id. at 84.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Horovitz, supra note 16, at lB.
34. For example, marketing analysts state that McDonald's $5.3 million dollar
sponsorship of Bill Elliot in 1995 paid off in $15 million in television exposure. Id.
35. Oliver, supra note 15, at 75. The survey, conducted by Performance Research,
revealed that over 70% of fans say they favor sponsor's products.
36. J. Taylor Buckley, Wall St. Revved on Racing There's More to NASCAR than Beer,
Oil, USA TODAY, Dec. 17, 1996, at 1A. Specifically, over 100 million people viewed
telecasts of NASCAR events in 1995. Id.
37. Horovitz, supra note 16.
38. Buckley, supra note 36, at 1A.
39. Horovitz, supra note 16. Within six months of becoming a sponsor, the Cartoon
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obviously targets young people, a new generation of fans.40 In a
perfect world, this sponsorship could be separated from tobacco's
involvement in the sport. However, some people see the natural
attraction of sporting events, coupled with the influence of television,
causing children to link Fred Flinstone, NASCAR and tobacco,
thereby encouraging teen smoking. There is some evidence which
indicates that some tobacco manufacturers have targeted under-age
audiences through sports in the past.41
The final rule implemented by the FDA embraces the notion that
sponsorship creates affiliations in young people between the lifestyle
projected by sports and athletes, and the product involved.42 The
rule's stated purpose in this regard is to "break the link between
tobacco brand-sponsored events and images and use of tobacco by
young people., 43 Assuming for the moment that such a link exists,
there are three challenges to this rule. It must be proven that the rule:
1)is within the scope of the FDA's authority; 2) does not infringe upon
the First Amendment rights of tobacco companies; and 3) does not
constitute a taking of the tobacco companies' property. The first two
challenges seem surmountable, but the third might well make these
rules prohibitively expensive.
B. The FDA, Regulation and the Current Debate
The concept of banning tobacco companies from sport
sponsorship is not new. From 1987 to 1993, no fewer than seven bills
were introduced in Congress that contained similar provisions."
Noticeably, all failed.4 However, the past few years have revealed
Network, owned by Hanna-Barbara, was ranked among the top five in terms of
merchandising revenue. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,529 (1996) (codified
at 21 C.F.R. pt. 897) (discussing comments to proposed regulations citing Virginia Slim's
now discontinued sponsorship of tennis as targeting young females). See also 61 Fed. Reg.
44,484 (1996) (discussing prior findings as to United States' Tobacco Company's use of a
"graduation strategy" to get young male consumers to progress from low nicotine to higher
nicotine brands of smokeless tobacco, and the use of "macho imagery" and sports stars in
that strategy).
42. 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396,44,530.
43. Id. at 44,396.




that tobacco consumption among young people has reached alarming
proportions.46 Over four million young people are believed to use
tobacco products.47 This is especially troublesome since the purchase
of tobacco products by teenagers is illegal throughout the United
States.48
Still, the debate rages over whether the means employed by the
government in this instance will achieve the desired end. While most
Americans support the FDA's efforts to curb teen smoking,49 the final
rules have been challenged as both beyond the FDA's capacity to
regulate and in violation of the First Amendment.5" What follows is a
brief discussion of those challenges, an analysis of the summary
judgment ruling in Coyne Beahm and an argument for why the takings
doctrine may provide the ultimate resolution of the situation.
1. Challenging the FDA's Power
The first argument raised by the tobacco industry is that the FDA
has no authority to regulate tobacco. 51 This claim is premised on clear
congressional intent to exempt cigarettes from FDA control under the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act ("FCLAA"). 5 2
Several law review articles have echoed, although not as stridently,
similar themes.53 At the same time, other commentators have
advocated the FDA's position.54 On balance, it seems that there is
enough strength in the latter argument to invoke judicial deference to
the FDA's decision. This position is generally supported by Judge
Osteen in his summary judgment ruling.55
As noted above, much of the argument surrounds what Congress
did or did not intend in the passage of the FCLAA. One
46. Id. at 400.
47. Id. at 399.
48. Id. at 399-400.
49. In 1995, 85% of respondents to a Los Angeles Times poll indicated their support
for the agency's campaign to curb teen smoking. Bill Clinton vs. Joe Camel, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Sept. 2, 1996, at 12.
50. See supra notes 7, 8.
51. Plaintiffs' Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1 1, Coyne Beahm,
966 F. Supp. at 1375.
52. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1996)).
53. See Noah & Noah, supra note 8, at 62; Whatley, supra note 8, at 135.
54. Harder, supra note 8, at 401.
55. See Coyne Beahm, 966 F. Supp. at 1388.
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commentator, Michael Whatley, views the failure of attempts to
specifically grant the FDA authority over tobacco, along with the
passage of the FCLAA in 1965, as evidence of congressional intent to
withhold such jurisdiction.56 Whatley also points to the 1972
statements of then FDA commissioner Charles Edwards that
Congress had exclusive control over cigarette regulation.57 In addition,
Whatley mentions that statements made in exempting tobacco from
regulation as a toxic substance show that Congress felt that the
FCLAA was a comprehensive act and that any other regulation would
also require an act of Congress.58 Finally, he points out that Congress
has acted to educate people about the dangers of smokeless tobacco
while refusing to confer regulatory authority directly on the FDA.5
9
Yet, after stating that "[a]s evidenced by numerous concessions of
anti-tobacco forces, clear congressional legislative intent, and several
findings by congressional committees, Congress has reserved for itself
the right to regulate tobacco and tobacco products." 60 Whatley is
forced to admit that the decision to reject the regulations is not that
simple. Specifically, he states that the doctrine of Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.61 applies.62 Under the
rubric of Chevron, great deference must be accorded to the FDA's
position unless it can conclusively be shown that Congress "has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue." 63 In this case, a clear
congressional directive is not obvious.
First, while the FCLAA is comprehensive within the limited
sphere of cigarette labeling, 64 that is not the issue at hand. Congress'
stated goal was to:
establish a comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette
labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between
smoking and health, whereby-
56. Whatley, supra note 8, at 123.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id at 124 (citing the 1984 enactment of the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco
Health Education Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (1994)).
60. Id. at 125.
61. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
62. Whatley, supra note 8, at 135.
63. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1996).
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(1) the public may be adequately informed about any adverse health
effects of cigarette smoking by inclusion of warning notices on each
package of cigarettes and in each advertisement of cigarettes .... 65
If only the first portion were read, then perhaps it could be said
that Congress pre-empted any further regulation of cigarette
advertising. It certainly has been used to pre-empt state law claims of
mislabeling of tobacco products.' At the same time, the pre-emption
statement in the statute itself only bars the requirement of additional
statements related to smoking and health.67 The concept that this is a
narrow proscription is borne out by case law. This statute has proven
sufficient to strike down state requirements of further health messages
in cigarette advertising.68 . It also has been used to strike down local
restrictions on in-store advertising. 69 At the same time, restrictions on
the location of billboards have been upheld.70 Penn Advertising relied
on the distinction between regulation of location and regulation of
content.71 Similarly, most of the new FDA rules deal with location of
advertising and prohibition. Those that do regulate content arguably
do not deal with the advertisements' health messages. As such, under
Chevron, Congress has not specifically spoken on the issue.
It would seem necessary that any judge defer to the judgment of
the FDA in this matter. However, the Noahs argue that this is not
necessarily so, 72 They contend that while deference should be shown
in how the FDA interprets its statutory authority, no such latitude is
necessary where the agency oversteps its jurisdiction.73 They claim
that the FDA's action on tobacco is simply one more example of the
65. Id.
66. See Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985).
See also Allgood v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 80 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 1996).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1996).
68. See Vango Media v. City of New York, 34 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1994).
69. See Chiglo v. City of Preston, 909 F. Supp. 675 (D. Minn. 1995).
70. See Penn Adver. v. Mayor & City Council, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated
sub. nom, Penn Adver. v. Schmoke, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996), affd on reh'g, 101 F.3d 332 (4th
Cir. 1996). Note that this case had been vacated in light of 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island,
517 U.S. 484 (1996), and had not considered the interpretation of 15 U.S.C. § 1334. Similar
bans have since been passed in Tacoma-Pierce County (Washington), Florida, Mississippi,
San Francisco, New York, Oakland, Los Angeles County, and Chicago. See Diane Brooks,
Cities, States Restricting Tobacco Ads, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 2, 1997, at B2.
71. Penn Adver., 63 F.3d 1318.
72. Noah & Noah, supra note 8, at 8.
73. Id.
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agency being "creative" in defining its mandate.74 They posit that
defining tobacco and cigarettes as a drug under the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act 75 is questionable. 76 They also argue that
Congress has not delegated full regulatory authority over cigarettes to
any agency, and that the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has the
best claim to such power.
77
In support of their first argument, the Noahs examine the recent
history of the FDA and the language of the FD&C Act. They concede
that the FDA's mandate has broadened over the last twenty-five
years, but take issue with the methods employed. 78 The Noahs argue
this latest extension would divert too many of the FDA's assets from
its "core missions."'79 Other than this speculation and commentary, the
thrust of the argument lies in the FD&C Acts requirement of intent to
affect the human body to trigger FDA regulation.80 The article points
out that customarily, such a determination is made based on product
labeling or promotional claims. 81 This rubric has been followed by the
FDA on tobacco products in the past, and only those making health
claims have been regulated.82 The only time regulation without such a
claim has been previously considered was for "smokeless cigarettes."8
3
The FDA eventually declined to rule on this product, as the
manufacturer pulled it from the market due to poor consumer
reception.84 Tobacco companies make no overt claims of this sort, and
executives have even publicly stated that they do not believe tobacco
is addictive.8 5 If this was the extent of the argument, the FDA could
not regulate cigarettes.
74. Id. at 7.
75. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1996).
76. Noah & Noah, supra note 8, at 9-15.
77. Id. at 15-21.
78. Id. at 8-9 (describing such expansion as "self-serving and generous claims of
power.").
79. Id. at 9, n.28.
80. Id. at 10.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 10, n.34.
83. Id. at 11. Smokeless cigarettes heat tobacco without burning it, a process that
provides nicotine without as many toxic by-products. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 12-13.
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However, the FDA has concluded that the tobacco companies
really do intend cigarettes to affect the body.86 This is determination
results from two evidentiary components. The first is a body of
scientific studies linking nicotine use to addiction. 7 By itself even this
would not be enough to overcome the statements of the industry to
the contrary.88 However, the FDA has also been the recipient of the
tobacco industry's internal documents. These damning volumes
contradict the industry's public claims, going so far as to compare
nicotine to morphine and cocaine. 89 This material also reveals an
industry that not only knows what it is doing, but seeks to manipulate
the amount of nicotine within cigarettes.90
In the face of this evidence, the industry refuses to concede
jurisdiction. Instead, they insist that only their public claims can be
used against them.91 While endorsing this stance in general, even the
Noahs admit that proof of nicotine manipulation could be enough to
demonstrate intended use as a drug.92
Still, this does not exhaust the Noahs' argument against FDA
authority. Next they attack the agency's right to regulate in this field. 93
Here the Noahs put forth the idea that because the FTC and not the
FDA has primary jurisdiction over cigarette advertising, Congress
meant to give the FTC primary jurisdiction over all cigarette-related
matters.94 Ultimately the article concludes that neither agency has
been delegated legislative authority in this area. 95
Most of the evidence of this argument is based on Congressional
silence. First of all, the Noahs note the lack of a specific grant of
authority to the FDA in this area.96 They interpret this as being in line
with the FDA's own prior position that they have only limited
authority over tobacco. 97 They also point out that several laws
86. Id. at 12.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 13.
90. Id. at 13-14.
91. Id. at 14.
92. Id. at 15.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 21.
96. Id. at 16.
97. Id.
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regulating tobacco advertising do not mention the FDA by name, but
rather give control to the FTC.98 After reviewing these laws,
regulations promulgated under them, and Congress' strict scrutiny of
the same, the article concludes that no agency has been granted broad
authority in this area.99 From this analysis, one can conclude that the
FDA's current regulations lack validity.
This argument is both too narrow and too broad. It attempts to
argue that the field of tobacco related concerns is so uniform as to
allow legislation in one limited area to pre-empt the field. While it is
true that the labeling acts did confer limited power to the FTC, they
were narrowly tailored to meet certain limited goals. No judgment was
handed down classifying tobacco as a drug and giving power over its
regulation to the FTC. The mere fact that the FDA had not previously
determined all cigarettes to be within its ambit did not mean that on
proper evidence they could not be. That evidence, unavailable in 1964
or 1984, now strongly suggests that tobacco companies knew all along
that they were in the drug business. In light of these revelations, it
seems only logical to place their regulation within the power of the
FDA.
Intriguingly, Judge Osteen's ruling generally disagrees with both
the Noahs and Whatley, and yet reached the ultimate result that the
regulations on advertising were improper. 1 ° The bulk of the ruling
explains why no legislation demonstrates that Congress either
intended to exempt tobacco from FDA regulation or confer this
jurisdiction elsewhere. 1 1 Specifically, he rejects the contention that
the FCLAA constitutes a delegation of authority to the Federal Trade
Commission.1°2 Rather, he finds that there have been only sporadic
and specific delegations of power to other agencies. 10 3
Moreover, Osteen's ruling flatly denies that the FDA's former
opinion controls the administration's ability to issue future
regulations." Citing Chevron,10 5 he states that the agency is
permitted to change their mandate to reflect altered circumstances or
98. Id. at 17.
99. Id. at 17-21.
100. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374,1397 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
101. Id. at 1379-97.
102. Id. at 1385.
103. Id. at 1384-87.
104. Id. at 1383-84.
105. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
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evidence. 10 6 Based on this, he firds that tobacco can be regulated as a
drug, and that cigarettes can qualify as delivery devices. 10 7 As such,
Osteen has no problem with the bulk of the regulations passed by the
FDA, dealing with restricting sales to minors and labeling on cigarette
packets." 8
Yet while he rejected every challenge to the FDA's general
authority, Osteen refused to recognize that the controls on advertising
and promotion were within the FDA's jurisdiction.10 9 Rather, he
found that section 360j(e) of the Federal Drug and Cosmetics Act
justified restrictions on sales, but defined that term narrowly to
encompass only the act of direct merchant-consumer interaction.1 0
This was not based on any legal precedent, but on Osteen's own
interpretation of the phrase "sale," coupled with the existence of
certain specific procedures for regulating advertising in other sections
of the act."'
This portion of the ruling seems destined for reversal. First, it
seems to run afoul of the very deference Chevron commands. While
allowing the FDA to fully restrict actual legitimate purchases, it stops
the only agency that has tried to stem the tide of teenage demand for
tobacco in this country. Second, similar restrictions imposed by the
City of Baltimore were upheld by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals." 2 It is unlikely they will reach a contrary result in this case.
Finally, the structure of this part of the ruling at most creates a
temporary setback to the imposition of such regulations. The court in
Coyne Beahm acknowledges that the FDA can restrict misleading
advertising under sections 352(q) and 352(r) of the same act.113 The
FDA could recast these same provisions as new regulations by
applying the previously compiled data and findings to declare that
virtually all tobacco advertising is inherently misleading and alluring
to children. Moreover, under Chevron, a reviewing court would be
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1388-95.
108. Id. at 1400.
109. Id. at 1397-99.
110. Id. at 1398.
111. Id.
112. Penn Advertising v. Mayor & City Council, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated
sub nom., Penn Advertising v. Schmoke, 116 S.Ct. 2575 (1996), aff'd on reh'g, 101 F.3d 332
(4th Cir. 1996).
113. Coyne Beahm, 966 F. Supp. at 1399.
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compelled to uphold such an attempt. Thus, it would seem this ruling
is at most an opening salvo in the debate over these regulations.
Without Congressional action to pass the settlement legislation, the
ability of the FDA to regulate tobacco and restrict its advertising and
promotion appears vindicated.
2. The First Amendment
If the tobacco giants lose round one of this epic battle, they will
claim that the FDA regulations violate their First Amendment rights
to free speech. 114 While a full discussion of the issues involved is
beyond the scope of this note, a brief overview seems necessary. 115
The issue has commentators split. Whereas even critics of FDA
regulation concede its constitutionality under current case law,116
various doctrines are proposed to limit its applicability." 7
Without foreclosing the possibility that a new doctrine will come
out of this controversy, it seems prudent to review the issue strictly
under current standards for commercial speech. This standard is
delineated under the four-part analysis of Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York.118
The first requirement of the Central Hudson analysis requires
that the regulated speech must pertain to lawful activities and be
accurate for it to have any First Amendment protection. 119 This might
be difficult for the tobacco industry to prove. While selling cigarettes
in general is lawful, targeting underage consumers is not. To qualify
for First Amendment protection, the industry will have to
demonstrate that their advertising does not target children. While
114. Plaintiffs' Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1 95, Coyne Beahm,
966 F. Supp. 1374.
115. The articles listed in supra note 7 provide an introduction to a more thorough
discussion of the commercial speech doctrine and its application to this topic.
116. Noah & Noah, supra note 7, at 59.
117. Richards challenges the-regulations for their dampening effect on the debate over
tobacco and "viewpoint discrimination." Richards, supra note 7, at 1185-89. Redish
similarly states that this does not comport with traditional notions of free speech under the
commercial speech doctrine. Redish, supra note 7. at 589. Others wish to use this debate as
a vehicle for eradicating the Commercial Speech Doctrine entirely. See, e.g., Scott Joachim,
Note, Seeing Beyond the Smoke and Mirrors: A Proposal For the Abandonment of the
Commercial Speech Doctrine and an Analysis of Recent Tobacco Advertising Regulations,
19 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 517 (1997).
118. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
119. Id. at 566.
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many aspects of tobacco advertising are facially neutral, characters
such as Joe Camel and promotions such as trading point incentives
may prove tough for the tobacco industry to justify.
Assuming the vast majority of advertising qualifies for First
Amendment protection, the second prong of the Central Hudson
analysis asks if the proposed restrictions further a substantial state
interest. 2 Arguing that the state's interest in preventing teen
smoking is insubstantial would seem futile since the purchase of
cigarettes by teenagers is in itself illegal. Banning the advertising that
promotes such an illegal activity is only a logical extension of the
state's interest in enforcing its laws. Furthermore, the Federal
Government asserts a substantial interest in protecting public
health.121
The next phase of the analysis concerns the means the state
adopted to further its interest. These means must have a direct impact
on the interest advanced, and must not be excessively restrictive of
speech to accomplish those ends.122 It is clear that the new regulations
are designed, as a package, to directly affect the rate of teenage
smoking in America. It is somewhat speculative as to what the direct
impact on consumption would be as a result of bans on advertising and
crackdowns on underage purchases. Still, this is hardly the sort of
indirect effect the Court discussed in Central Hudson. There the Court
noted such items as complete bans on advertising by professionals to
maintain the ethics and standards of the profession as unconstitutional
indirect effects. 123
The only real hope for defeating these regulations is to find that
they are not narrowly tailored to achieve the state's goals. It might be
argued that restrictions on purchase should suffice. It has also been
argued that raising taxes on cigarettes could make them so
prohibitively expensive as to make purchase and consumption by
teens less likely. 24 Furthermore, these regulations are not explicitly
120. Id. at 564.
121. Noah & Noah, supra note 8, at 56 (citing Regulations Restricting the Sale and
Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61
Fed. Reg. at 44,472-73).
122. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
123. Id. at 564-65 (discussing Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977)).
124. Noah & Noah, supra note 8, at 59.
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limited to advertising directed at children. 125 However, the extent of
the problem of teen smoking, coupled with specific fact-finding by the
FDA,126 will most likely lead the court to uphold these regulations as
sufficiently narrow.
3. Why a Takings Challenge Works Better
A better argument to rescind the FDA restrictions would be to
claim that the restrictions constitute a taking of intellectual property.
Although dismissed as one of "various and sundry other constitutional
arguments," 127 a takings claim has many advantages. Unlike arguing a
lack of FDA authority, a takings claim requires no challenge to the
current trend towards agency deference. It also does not require the
adoption of a new doctrine or severe changes in current Supreme
Court precedent, as a First Amendment challenge would. At the same
time, the compensation due would probably be sufficient to deter the
government from implementing certain aspects of the regulations,
while allowing all sides to claim that they are furthering the cause of
reducing teen smoking. As an alternative, the existence of such a claim
could provide the impetus to ratify the attorney's general settlement.
The following section examines the requirements of a takings claim
and applies it in the context of the Winston Cup.
II
Analysis
A takings claim has three requirements. First, the property must
be within the meaning of the doctrine. Second, the government must
have taken the property for public use. Third, the owner of the
property must be paid just compensation.128 This section analyzes the
applicability of a takings claim to the Winston Cup under the new
regulations.
125. Id. at 58.
126. Id. at 57 & nn.242-44 (citing Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of
Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg.
44,466-69, 44,475-95).
127. Id. at n.228.
128. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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A. The Property Interest at Stake
Certainly, no taking can occur without property being involved.
Takings of intangible property pose particular problems in this regard,
since no title is conveyed, and no land is physically occupied. As such,
it becomes critical to properly identify the property rights involved
and determine whether the doctrine applies to it at all. Several
otherwise protectable interests may not be sufficiently severable for
the purposes of this doctrine.129 Furthermore, interests recognized as
property for procedural due process claims might not qualify under a
takings analysis.' 30
In the current case, the property involved is the name of the race
series, Winston Cup. It is not the sponsorship itself, since that is only
being restrained rather than destroyed. R.J. Reynolds can still sponsor
racing, just not under any tobacco brand name.131 Furthermore, the
interest implicated is not the tobacco products in question. While this
restriction may reduce purchases, tobacco companies will still make a
decent return on their money. Indeed, were profit the measure of a
takings claim this would prove a futile effort, since a tobacco giant like
R.J. Reynolds might actually benefit from a lack of advertising by
their competitors.
However, the phrase Winston Cup has been rendered completely
useless. It cannot be used to sponsor any event or appear on any
merchandise or advertising.132 As such, its value is reduced from at
least $30 million, what R.J. Reynolds reportedly pays NASCAR for
the sponsorship,133 to nothing. It is also a separate interest. R.J.
Reynolds' right to sponsor car races exists separately from its rights to
possess, use, and exclude others from using the term Winston Cup.
Still, it remains to be shown that this fact matters. If this right is not a
property interest recognized by the Supreme Court as subject to
takings claims, loss of value does not matter.
129. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)
(finding restrictions on coal mining constitutional as exploitation of coal inseparable from
effect on land).
130. See Pittman v. Chicago Board of Education, 64 F.3d 1098 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding
public employment, while property under Due Process, did not come within the meaning of
the takings clause).
131. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396.
132. Id.
133. See supra notes 10-12.
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In recognizing property rights, the Court has rejected an overly
narrow reading of 'property' in the clause itself.134 Rather than
limiting it to the:
vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to
which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law.., it may have
been employed in a more accurate sense to denote the group of
rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the
right to possess, use and dispose of it. In point of fact, the
construction given the phrase has been the latter.135
In light of this, it seems that things that have the qualities of
property, intangible or tangible, can qualify for takings clause
protection. Here, the term Winston Cup possesses these qualities. R.J.
Reynolds possesses it, uses it, and could dispose of it if it chose to do
SO.
Furthermore, the Court has often reiterated that for the purposes
of takings claims, "[property] interests.., are not created by the
Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law.", 36 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
recognized that Missouri state law protects trade secrets as intangible
property interests under the takings clause. 137 In making this
determination, the court focused on how similar intangible pieces of
property were treated under the clause.138 There is no reason why a
protectable name should not also be recognized as a property interest.
In addition to state law and precedent, custom and usage can
create a property right.139 Nixon recognized a property interest of a
former President in his official papers, using the customary practice of
other presidents to determine that such a right existed.14° In the
current case, it is obvious that sponsors treat their sponsorship names
as their property. They license advertising and souvenirs with their
134. See United States v. General Motor Corp., 323 U.S. 373,377-378 (1964).
135. Id.
136. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984) (quoting Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (quoting Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,577 (1972))).
137. Id. at 1003.
138. Id. (citing protection of Materialman's liens, real estate liens, and valid contracts).
139. See Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing United
States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691 (1832)).
140. Id.
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sponsorship title, exclude others from using it, advertise their product
through it, and reap the benefits of its use.
Under all of these analyses, Winston Cup would seem to qualify
for takings clause protection. The next hurdle, though, is establishing
that the current regulations operate as a taking, either in a physical or
regulatory sense.
B. Does the New Regulatory Scheme Constitute a Taking Requiring
Compensation?
Determining whether a taking has occurred can be difficult.
Classic condemnation actions are easy to determine, and rarely create
conflict. However, regulations that cause partial physical occupations
or are simply too restrictive are much harder to identify. A partial
invasion does not eliminate all use of the property, but does eliminate
the use of a portion of the property. For that reason, regulations
requiring such invasions have been deemed per se takings with regards
to that portion of the property.141 By comparison, regulatory takings
are really just situations where the regulation of property "goes too
far."'142 As a result, the court engages in "essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries" to determine if the regulation in question goes beyond the
pale.143
An argument can be made that under either of the latter two
categories a taking has occurred. If the current action can only be
found to be a taking in the last regulatory category then a "police
power" defense might insulate the FDA's action. However, a slight
adjustment in Court doctrine there could result in a tobacco victory.
1. The Current Regulatory Scheme as a Per Se Taking
If a regulation requires a "property owner to suffer a physical
'invasion' of his property" it is a taking requiring compensation. 44
This is true regardless of how small the invasion is, or what state
interest motivates it.1 45 As a result, even the smallest permanent
141. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (citing
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 459 (1982)).
142. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
143. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
144. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
145. See id.
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dispossession, such as requiring an easement of a few cubic feet for
cable transformers, requires compensation.146
Applying the above reasoning to the term Winston Cup might
seem facetious at first. After all, the requirement of a per se taking is
generally a physical invasion. This might seem impossible in light of
the intangible nature of the property involved. However, this category
of taking has not been limited to real property, despite the physical
invasion requirement.147 In Nixon, the D.C. Circuit asserted that "in
Loretto, the Court based the per se takings rationale on a passage
from Professor Michelman's seminal article on takings."'14 This
passage states "[tihe one incontestable case for compensation (short
of formal expropriation) seems to occur when the government
deliberately brings it about that its agents, or the public at large,
'regularly use,' or 'permanently' occupy, space or a thing which
theretofore was understood to be under private ownership.' 149 In
Nixon, this passage was cited as support for the recognition of a taking
of personal property, namely former President Nixon's Presidential
papers, under the per se doctrine.150
There is no reason why intangible property cannot also be
subjected to a per se taking through regulation. Certainly, if a piece of
advertising was used by the government for a public advertisement,
that would constitute a taking. Furthermore, if all physical
manifestations of a previously legal advertising campaign were
surrendered to the government, and all such future manifestations
banned, that property would be under as complete government
control as Nixon's papers were under the Presidential Recorded
Materials Act.151 It was this control, coupled with the loss of rights
associated with ownership, that caused the D.C. Circuit to find a
taking in Nixon's case.152
146. See id. (discussing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982)).
147. See Nixon, 978 F.2d at 1284.
148. See id. at 1285 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 427 n.5 (1982) (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments
on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1164, 1184
(1967))).
149. Michelman, supra note 148, at 1184 (emphasis added).
150. Nixon, 978 F.2d at 1287.
151. Id. at 1285.
152. Id. at 1285-86.
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Similarly, R.J. Reynolds has lost both the control of and
ownership rights to the Winston Cup name. Once the regulations go
into effect, they will not be able to use Winston Cup or its associated
rights in any meaningful fashion. The loss is even more complete for
intangible property created for a very limited purpose than if the
property possessed some independent, tangible value. Additionally,
the company could not sell Winston Cup and its associated rights,
since all physical manifestations of the phrase run afoul of the
regulations if they are attached to any event. Finally, their power to
exclude others from using Winston Cup is severely diminished in a
practical sense. Under these regulations, the company has no reason
to try to stop others-what value will be lost by any such use?
It will do no good for the government to argue that they are not
using Winston Cup themselves. While true in a narrow sense, actual
proactive use is not necessary. Mere occupation of the thing, as well as
the use, can result in a taking. The government has occupied Winston
Cup completely by eliminating any use by the current owner. They
also are using the name in a broader sense. By taking the event out of
the public eye, the government hopes to reduce teen smoking. It is the
same as razing an eyesore to help property values, or condemning an
unsafe building to prevent people from being injured when it falls. In
each of these cases the owner of the property has lost something
permanently. As in each of those previous cases, the owner should be
compensated.
2. The Current Scheme as a Classic Regulatory Taking
If a court refuses to incorporate intangible property into the
physical invasion category of per se takings, it might still find a
regulatory taking as a classic, ad hoc factual determination. The best
hope for this is the least likely-that the Supreme Court will expand
Lucas to incorporate other forms of property as well as land that has
lost all economically viable use. Otherwise, R.J. Reynolds will be hard
pressed to show that the new regulations are not a justified use of the
police power.
In Lucas, the Court recognized that any regulation which
removes all economic value or use from land is categorically a taking
requiring compensation. 5 3 The Court rejected an argument that a
property owner took title to land "subject to the 'implied limitation'
153. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
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that the State may subsequently eliminate all economically viable
use." 154 As a result, the police power could only serve to justify a
complete reduction in the land's economic value where the use
involved is a nuisance under pre-existing state property law.'55 At the
same time, the Court reiterated the notion that police power could be
a justification for refusing compensation in cases of personal property,
even where all economic value was lost.' 56
However, the Court in Lucas did not elaborate a firm standard
for determining when this implied limitation justification could be
used. It did mention that the "State's traditionally high degree of
control over commercial dealings" justified an assumption that the
owners of goods used for "sale or manufacture for sale" are aware that
regulations can render their property valueless. 57 Furthermore, the
Court found that such an "implied limitation" on land use was
"inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in the Takings
Clause that has become part of our constitutional culture."' 58 This
distinction seems artificial and cramped.
For one thing, title to land has been the exclusive creation of the
state since at least Johnson v. M'Intosh.'5 9 To argue that land is
somehow less susceptible to regulation by virtue of its sacred place is
either a vast oversimplification or anachronistic revisionism by the
court. Furthermore, individuals generally take any property, not just
land, with an expectation that the state is not going to unilaterally
declare it unusable. Perhaps the Court was right when it observed that
items specifically designed for sale or manufacture for sale are so
related to commerce that the possibility of some state regulation is
unavoidable. That even this property is taken with an understanding
that all value can be eradicated through regulation of a previously
lawful activity is far less certain.
It seems more prudent to use Lucas' underlying logic for other
property as well. Rather than focusing on whether something is real or
personal property, the emphasis properly should be on what
154. Id. at 1028.
155. Id. at 1029.
156. Id. at 1027.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1028.
159. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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"reasonable investment-backed expectations' 160  the owner
legitimately had with regards to the property in light of the prevailing
law of the time. This is very similar to the more generalized rationale
of "typical" regulatory takings, but the drastic impact of such
regulations as proposed in Lucas and here require a shift in emphasis.
A reduction in value through new regulation might well be justified as
a use of the police power, even where such action was not foreseen,
with regard to both 'real and personal property. In the case of a
complete loss of all economic value, however, only those foreclosures
occurring where future eradication through regulation was reasonably
foreseeable seem justifiable without compensation. This is true
regardless of the type of property involved.
Of course, expectations with regard to property are more than
"unilateral expectation[s] or ... abstract need[s].,' 161 In Ruckelshaus,
Monsanto was found to have no expectation of privacy in revealing
trade secret information to the EPA under a new regulatory
scheme.162 This was because Monsanto was well aware of the uses the
EPA would put such information to, including disclosure. 163 Thus, it
must be shown that any expectation was legitimate.
Here, R.J. Reynolds has been using the same piece of intellectual
property for twenty-five years. When they began to sponsor races, the
FDA said publicly that it would not regulate tobacco. While this did
not mean that the FDA could never assert such jurisdiction, as it has
now, the public statement seems to create a reasonable expectation on
the part of R.J. Reynolds that their sponsorship of the sport was not
illegal. Furthermore, Congress had specifically delineated what media
were off limits to tobacco in the previous decade. Overall, R.J.
Reynolds had a reasonable expectation that this property would not
be destroyed by the government, and has relied on that expectation by
investing hundreds of millions of dollars in their sponsorship over the
last quarter century. That would certainly seem to be a reasonable
investment-backed expectation, which has been completely destroyed
by new governmental regulation.
If despite all of this, a court still finds that police power can
legitimize this sort of impact on intangible property, R.J. Reynolds is
160. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986,1005 (1984).
161. See Webb's Famous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155,161 (1980).
162. 467 U.S. at 1006.
163. Id.
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likely to find itself without compensation. Although not specifically
designed for direct sale or manufacture for sale, Winston Cup is
directly tied to commerce. As such, a strong argument for complete
state control exists. At the same time, so much is subject to Commerce
Clause regulation at this point in history that legitimizing complete
reductions in value for personal property without compensation seems
to be an enormous grant of power.
III
Proposal
If a court refuses to find a taking here, then we really will have
two Takings Clauses. One will respect the absolute right in land,
thereby not permitting any physical occupation by the government nor
permitting the loss of all economic value to be justified on any basis.
The other will permit any personal property that is somehow related
to commerce, regardless of its value and importance, to be diminished
to nothing by state regulations that invoke the police power. This
dichotomy goes against thirty years of Supreme Court doctrine that
characterizes property as a bundle of rights and not as a physical res. It
also creates a sacrosanct position for land which does not recognize
the realities of a modern world where intangible property is the basis
of great wealth and much of the national economy.
Law should reflect society, not chain it to the past. For that
reason, courts should expand their definitions of takings to look
beyond simple classifications and look to the relationships between
owner and property, owner and society, and owner and state. Where
one of the parties has violated the reasonable expectations of the
other, compensation should be due. If one neighbor abuses another's
expectations, he should be held to pay civil damages. If the owner uses
property against the reasonable expectations of the law, then his
property can be controlled through law, and its value is properly
forfeited. However, when the state determines to go against the
established, reasonable expectations of its citizenry to be secure in
their property, it owes them compensation as well.
1998]
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IV
Conclusion
There is nothing particularly wrong with the FDA's new
regulations. Indeed, they are designed to address a major problem in
the United States. However, in violating the expectations of R.J.
Reynolds that the government created by allowing them to sponsor
NASCAR, the FDA has utilized its power in an extreme fashion.
Their destruction of this valuable property can only be justified if R.J.
Reynolds receives fair and just compensation. This can happen either
through a claim against the government or as part of a mutually
agreed upon compromise. If it does not, then we as a legal society
have stepped back to a time when land was the only property of value.
The implications of recognizing superior rights for the landed class
should not go unheeded.
